GARRY FINAL.DOC

3/6/2006 3:24:33 PM

A One-Sided Federalism Revolution:
The Unaddressed Constitutional Compromise
on Federalism and Individual Rights
Patrick M. Garry∗
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION: THE TWO SIDES OF FEDERALISM ........................851
THE FEDERALISM DOCTRINE .........................................................854
A. Constitutional Principles....................................................854
B. The Values of Federalism...................................................858
III. FEDERALISM AT THE SUPREME COURT ..........................................861
A. The Decline of Federalism.................................................861
B. The Rehnquist Court’s Revival of Federalism...................866
1. The Tenth Amendment Decisions...............................866
2. Commerce Power Limitations......................................870
3. State Sovereign Immunity ............................................871
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF FEDERALISM ..............................873
A. A Structural Provision ........................................................873
B. Judicial Balancing of Structure and Individual Rights .....881
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHOOSING RIGHTS OVER STRUCTURE...883
A. A Disconnect Between Individuals and the Democratic
Process.................................................................................883
B. A Freedom Better Left to Structural Protections..............886
1. Judicial Development of Privacy Rights .......................886
2. A Liberty That Could Have Been.................................888
VI. CONCLUSION—THE NEXT STEP: A FULL RESTORATION OF
FEDERALISM’S STRUCTURAL PROTECTIONS ..................................890

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE TWO SIDES OF FEDERALISM

The revival of federalism has become a defining theme of the
modern Court. Commentators have described the Court’s decisions
as sparking a “federalism revolution.” This so-called revolution
comes after a long dormancy. From the late 1930s to the early 1990s,
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constitutional provisions related to federalism were largely ignored.
However, under the leadership of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist,
the Court has attempted to revive the constitutional role and authority of the states.
Through a wide array of cases employing both the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments, the Court has stalled or even reversed the
constitutional drift of power from the states to the federal government that began in the 1930s. This “new federalism” has attempted
to resuscitate the role of the states in the constitutional system, as well
as revive certain federalism doctrines that were abandoned during
the New Deal. Just as a frustration with the ineffectual response of
the states to the Great Depression caused regulators and constitutional lawyers to favor a dramatic expansion of the national government during the 1930s, a frustration with and suspicion of large, centralized government and its inflexible bureaucracies has helped fuel
the current drift toward empowering smaller, localized governments.
But in addition to this size-of-government concern, there is another
side of federalism—the individual liberty side. In the view of the constitutional Framers, a vibrant federalism would help ensure individual
liberty by limiting and monitoring the power of the federal government to infringe on the liberties of its citizens.
One of the primary constitutional rationales behind federalism
was the belief that such a governmental structure would help preserve
individual liberty. Strong and independent state governments would
check any abuses committed by the federal government. This structural aspect of the Constitution served as a complement to the Bill of
Rights, which explicitly recognized certain selected individual freedoms. But whereas the Bill of Rights protections were limited to its
identified freedoms, federalism had a much broader scope: built into
the very structure of America’s constitutional democracy, federalism
would protect individual liberty as a whole, in every aspect in which it
could be threatened by a distant central government.
This liberty aspect of federalism was largely abandoned in the
1930s when the Court ceased enforcing the federalism provisions of
the Constitution. This cessation marked a necessary step in upholding the New Deal legislation, which gave broad powers to the national
government. Having given up this structural protection of liberty,
the Court then focused almost exclusively on the substantive individual rights provisions in the Constitution as a way of protecting individual freedom. It was this focus, for instance, that led the Court to
derive new, unenumerated rights out of the general language of the
Constitution, such as the right to privacy. Instead of relying upon the
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structural organization of the Constitution to protect privacy, the
Court created a specific substantive right.
Looking back over nearly seventy years of constitutional history,
an inverse relationship can be detected between the Court’s activism
on substantive individual rights and its enforcement of structural
provisions such as federalism. The less the Court enforces structural
provisions, the more it relies on creating and enforcing substantive
individual rights. Consequently, now that the Court is reinvigorating
federalism, it should correspondingly lessen its activism on individual
rights, such as the right to privacy. In effect, this would form the second half of the federalism revolution—a stepping back from substantive individual rights as the only protection of individual liberty.
However, this has not yet occurred. Even though federalism has been
reinvigorated, the Court still relies as much as ever on judicial enforcement of substantive individual rights for the preservation of liberty.
History has shown that the Court elevated its scrutiny of individual rights, as well as its creation of new rights, only after it downgraded its scrutiny of structural issues like federalism. Therefore, it is
logical to expect that the reverse should happen: that after heightening its review of federalism doctrines it should diminish its scrutiny of
substantive individual rights. By taking such an approach, the Court
could reconnect with the structural ways in which the Constitution
protects liberty as a whole. Moreover, putting added emphasis on the
Constitution’s structural protections of liberty would help revive a notion that has practically disappeared in constitutional law: the notion
that individual liberty can and must coincide with majoritarian rule.
This Article begins Part II with a description of federalism and a
discussion of its basic principles as they appear in the Constitution. It
examines the Framers’ intent concerning the federalism scheme incorporated into the Constitution, as well as the purposes for which
those federalism principles were intended. Part III of the Article addresses the history of federalism decisions in the Supreme Court. In
particular, it analyzes the decline of federalism throughout much of
the twentieth century, during which time the Court intensified its review of individual rights cases so as to make up for its nonenforcement of structural provisions (e.g., federalism) designed to protect
individual liberty. Part III also examines the Rehnquist Court’s recent revival of federalism, which has occurred primarily in three constitutional areas: the Tenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and
the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity provisions.
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In Part IV, this Article examines the constitutional role of federalism as a structural protection of liberty. This structural feature was
intended by the Framers to provide a more all-encompassing protection of individual liberty than the Bill of Rights. However, because of
the constitutional compromise of the 1930s, the Court abandoned
the structural protections of federalism and instead focused its sights
exclusively on selected substantive individual rights. Part V addresses
the consequences of this constitutional compromise, the corrosive
fallout of which can be seen through the creation and application of
the constitutional right of privacy. Finally, in the Conclusion, this Article suggests that the modern Court has accomplished only one half
of a federalism revolution. Although it has strengthened the constitutional role and authority of the states, it has not carried the revolution over into the individual liberty area. Instead of increasing its reliance on the structural provisions of the Constitution to protect
liberty, the Court is still concentrating almost exclusively on substantive individual rights.
II. THE FEDERALISM DOCTRINE
A. Constitutional Principles
The doctrine of federalism refers to the sharing of power between two different levels of government, each representing the same
1
people. The Constitution establishes a dual governmental structure
consisting of state and national governments. Although its purpose
was to create a strong national government, the Constitution also
sought to preserve the independent integrity and lawmaking author2
ity of the states. This bifurcated system of power was codified in the
Tenth Amendment, which divides sovereign power between those
3
delegated to the federal government and those reserved to the states.
1

Federalism reflects the balancing of power between the states and national
government. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (suggesting that the constitutional scheme envisions a federal structure in which states are equal partners
with the national government). As David Walker describes it:
federalism is a governmental system that includes a central government
and at least one major subnational tier of governments; that assigns
significant substantive powers to both levels initially by the provisions of
a written constitution; and that succeeds over time in sustaining a territorial division of powers by judicial, operational, representational and
political means.
DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD WASHINGTON 20
(1995).
2
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1466 (1987).
3
Id. at 1492.
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The Tenth Amendment prohibits the national government from exercising undelegated powers that will infringe on the lawmaking
4
autonomy of the states.
The Framers believed that by protecting the pre-existing structure of state governments, the Constitution could safely grant power
to the national government, since the former would independently
5
monitor the latter’s exercise of power. Similar to the way in which
the colonial governments had mobilized opposition to oppressive acts
by Parliament, the state governments would serve as vigilant watch6
dogs against abuses committed by the federal government.
The founding generation was so committed to federalism that
even a nationalist like Justice Marshall acknowledged in McCulloch v.
7
Maryland that the national government was “one of enumerated
8
powers” and could “exercise only the powers granted to it.” Indeed,
federalism concerns were so important to the Founders that nearly all
the arguments opposing the new Constitution involved the threat to
9
state sovereignty.
Although there is no single “federalism” clause in the Constitution, the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments are often the focus of the
10
Court’s federalism decisions. In addition to these two amendments,
references to federalism pervade the constitutional scheme.
Throughout the text, the Framers use the term “states” to denote in11
dependent entities of sovereignty. The term “states” is also used in a
way that suggests the Framers “intended that these governments possess some of the traditional immunities that states enjoyed” prior to
12
adoption of the Constitution.
4

The Tenth Amendment states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
5
See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 108–11 (1981).
6
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); Amar, supra note 2, at 1501.
7
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
8
Id. at 405.
9
Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 252 (2000).
10
The Eleventh Amendment states that the “Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
11
Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual
Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV.
819, 821, 831–34 (1999).
12
Id. at 821. According to Nicholas Rosenkranz, the structure of the Constitution and its recognition of the “states” all work to establish federalism as a “constitu-
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In the constitutional scheme, federalism provides an avenue for
local self-determination, in addition to a vertical check on government oppression, with the states serving as a localized control on the
13
centralized national government. Under the Framers’ view of federalism, the national government would exert supreme authority only
within the limited scope of its enumerated powers; the states meanwhile would exercise the remainder of sovereign authority, subject to
14
the restraint of interstate competition from other states.
Because the Framers took for granted the sovereign powers of
the states, the Constitution is somewhat one-sided in its references to
governmental authority. It explicitly lists the powers of the federal
government; but to the extent it defines state powers, it does so primarily through negative implication, by setting out the limited con15
straints on those powers.
Furthermore, the Tenth Amendment,
though not granting power to any governmental entity, recognizes
that any and all powers not granted to the federal government have
16
been reserved to the states.
By prohibiting the federal government from infringing on powers reserved to the states, the Constitution establishes a system of dual
sovereignty. The Framers “split the atom of sovereignty” by designating two different political entities (federal and state), “each protected
17
from incursion by the other.” This division of authority between the
state and federal governments, with the latter enjoying only limited,
enumerated powers, was not created for the benefit of the states but
18
for the benefit of the American people. According to the Framers,
the principle of dual sovereignty would prevent any distortion of the
balance of power that in turn would subject the people to a tyrannous
19
federal government. As Professor Steven Calabresi explains, federalism is a vital ingredient of America’s constitutional democracy:
tional default rule.” Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2097 (2002).
13
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 504
(1987).
14
William H. Pryor, Jr., Madison’s Double Security: In Defense of Federalism, the Separation of Powers, and the Rehnquist Court, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1167, 1175 (2002).
15
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Jay S. Bybee, The Tenth Amendment Among the Shadows:
On Reading the Constitution in Plato’s Cave, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 555 (2000).
16
U.S. CONST. amend. X; Bybee, supra note 15, at 567.
17
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). The Constitution created a structure of “two orders of government,
each with its own direct relationship . . . to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.” Id.
18
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
19
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458–60 (1991).
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It prevents religious warfare, it prevents secessionist warfare, and
it prevents racial warfare. It is part of the reason why democratic
majoritarianism in the United States has not produced violence
or secession for 130 years, unlike the situation for example, in
England, France, Germany, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
Cyprus, or Spain. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is
more important or that has done more to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom than the federal structure of that great
20
document.

Principles of federalism are also incorporated within the Su21
premacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause safeguards federalism by
requiring that any federal law displacing a state law be adopted according to the precise lawmaking procedures outlined in the Consti22
tution. Even in those delegated areas where the national government has authority over the states, the Supremacy Clause limits the
federal laws to those meeting the constitutional procedures for “the
supreme Law of the Land.” Thus, federal lawmaking procedures preserve state autonomy by “‘impos[ing] burdens on governmental
23
processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable.’”
Although these cumbersome processes are often decried as contributing to gridlock, they give states more freedom to govern by making
it more difficult for the federal government to enact national laws
24
that supersede state laws.
The notion of federalism, premised on fostering a competition
for power between state and federal governments, is similar in many
ways to the constitutional separation of powers between the branches
25
of government. Both are structural provisions of the Constitution,
20

Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense
of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 770 (1995).
21
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states: “This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .” Id.
22
See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1338–39 (2001). “Although federal lawmaking procedures are generally
regarded as ‘integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers,’
they also preserve federalism both by making federal law more difficult to adopt, and
by assigning lawmaking power solely to actors subject to the political safeguards of
federalism.” Id. at 1324 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983)). The
Constitution also protects federalism by ensuring small-state equality of representation in the U.S. Senate and by giving states a prominent role in the selection of the
President. Id. at 1343–44, 1367–68.
23
Id. at 1371 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959) (alteration in original).
24
Id.
25
Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 915, 950 (2005) (arguing that, to the Framers, the competition among branches
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with the separation of powers doctrine focusing on the horizontal allocation of power among the different branches of the federal gov26
ernment. Federalism, on the other hand, addresses the vertical allocation of power and rests upon the Framers’ belief that “each of the
principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence
27
more or less to the favor of the State Governments.”
B. The Values of Federalism
The most-often cited value of federalism is that it provides a
28
check on the tyranny of the federal government. By granting only
limited powers to the national government, as well as by maintaining
two levels of competing governments, the Framers sought to control
29
the power of the national government. A second value of federalism
relates to the close relationship between state governments and their
constituencies, the assumption being that the smaller the governing
unit, the more likely it is to be responsive to the needs of the com30
munity. Smaller political units are also able to foster a deeper sense
would result in “a balanced equilibrium, in which no branch can accumulate a potentially monarchical or tyrannical quantum of power, try as each of them will”).
26
It was foreseen that the separation of powers alone would offer little protection
to the states, since it was presumed that all the federal branches would share an interest in expanding national power. John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1390–91 (1997).
27
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
28
Federalism offers a structure of “overlapping legal remedies for constitutional
wrongs.” Amar, supra note 2, at 1504. Although recent history focuses most attention on instances where the federal government has stepped in to remedy state violations of civil rights, there have also been times when the states have been called upon
to address federal abuses. Id. at 1506. Prior to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for example, only the state
law of trespass was available to persons whose homes had been illegally searched by
federal agents. Amar, supra note 2, at 1506. Furthermore, in the early state habeas
corpus cases, states provided a means by which those who were incarcerated in federal prisons, “in violation of their federal constitutional rights,” could obtain their
freedom. Id. at 1509.
29
Alexander Hamilton argued that the “necessity of local administrations for local purposes, would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use of such a
power.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). A “state/federal division of authority protects liberty—both by restricting the
burdens that government can impose from a distance and by facilitating citizen participation in government that is closer to home.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 655 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
30
See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91–92 (1995); Michael McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493–94
(1987) (reviewing RAOUL BURGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)). State
legislatures are better connected to their constituents’ interests than is Congress. See
V.F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 835, 875 (2004).
National decisionmakers or representatives are less likely to be aware of localized in-
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of community and increased opportunities for political participa31
tion. As Professor Wechsler has observed, the states “are the strategic yardsticks for the measurement of interest and opinion, the special centers of political activity, [and] the separate geographical
32
determinants of national as well as local politics.”
A third value of federalism lies in its facilitation of states as labo33
ratories of experimentation.
This value is reflected in Justice
Brandeis’s observation that “one of the happy incidents of the federal
system [is] that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
34
without risk to the rest of the country.” Of course, underlying this
social laboratory value, as well as all the other values of federalism, is
the right of individuals to move from state to state, and hence “vote
with their feet” on the desirability or wisdom of particular state poli35
cies.

terests than are decisionmakers or representatives in a disaggregated, state system.
Id.
31
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (stating that federalism
“makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry”); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 789–90
(1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that federalism fosters citizen participation in government affairs).
32
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546 (1954).
33
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (stating that federalism “allows for more innovation
and experimentation in government”). As Justice O’Connor has observed, “the 50
States [have] serve[d] as laboratories for the development of new social, economic,
and political ideas.” Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 456 U.S. at 788 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Furthermore, unlike Congress and the national government, the states are “neck-deep in the quotidian work of policing
streets, educating children, feeding the hungry, sheltering the homeless, and protecting the public health.” Aaron Jay Saiger, Constitutional Partnership and the States,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1439, 1443 (2005).
34
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). And not just state legislatures are capable of this experimentation. State judges
“‘demonstrate a greater willingness to experiment with legal norms,’” and because
they “‘are generally closer to the public’” any misjudgments they make are “‘more
readily redressable by the People.’” Saiger, supra note 33, at 1458–59 (quoting Helen
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review,
112 HARV. L. REV. 1132, 1163, 1168 (1999)).
35
Anuj C. Desai, Filters and Federalism: Public Library Internet Access, Local Control,
and the Federal Spending Power, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 52 (2004); see also William Van
Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the Cellophane
Sea, 1987 DUKE L.J. 769, 777 (arguing that the “constraints imposed as an incident of
federalism itself, namely that people can and will move, enter, or exit, if suitably attracted or repelled, as each state has reason to bear in mind”). Scholars argue that state
autonomy “allows those who disagree with certain policies, but are politically powerless to change them, to leave the jurisdiction or choose not to locate there in the first
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The existence of a multiplicity of geographically diverse jurisdictions is believed to “promote competition among governments for
citizens and corporations (and their related tax dollars), thereby
maximizing choice and utility for everyone and resulting in an aggre36
gate increase in social welfare.” This geographic diversity argument
pervades the various justifications for federalism. A federalism structure “assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive
37
to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society.” It allows different
communities to choose different laws and modes of governance that
38
reflect the diversity of citizen needs and interests. To the extent that
local majorities in different states have divergent preferences, a federal system can result in a higher degree of citizen satisfaction than a
39
unitary system can. If, for example, a majority in one state prefers a
policy of high taxes and high levels of government services, whereas
the majority in another state favors low taxes and fewer government
services, both majorities can be accommodated by their respective
40
state governments. A competition between states can also prevent

place.” Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475, 512 (2002).
36
Desai, supra note 35, at 50.
37
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
38
Desai, supra note 35, at 49.
39
John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial
Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 106 (2004).
40
The ability of federalism to satisfy diverse preferences obviously requires a degree of citizen mobility, whereby citizens who find themselves in a state whose policies they oppose “can move to another state with more favorable ones.” Id. at 107.
“As transportation costs have fallen, and a national culture makes Americans feel
more at home outside the state where they were born, citizens have become more
mobile.” Id. at 109. This mobility is further enhanced by the existence of interstate
competition through which states actively compete with each other to attract new
citizens. Id. at 108. “Interstate competition is motivated, in part, by the desire of
state governments to attract taxpaying citizens and corporations, which has the effect
of increasing the funds available to them for public spending of all kinds.” Id.
Even the Justices who dissented from the Court’s recent federalism decisions espouse the need for “robust [political] competition.” Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 123 (2004). Justice Stevens describes competition as “the ‘central theme’ of the Court’s democracy jurisprudence.”
Id. (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 382 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
According to Professor Amar:
a healthy competition among limited governments for the hearts of the
American People can protect popular sovereignty and spur a race to
the high ground of constitutional remedies. Each government can act
as a remedial cavalry of sorts, eager to win public honor by riding to
the rescue of citizens victimized by another government’s misconduct.
Amar, supra note 2, at 1428.
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the abuses often associated with monopoly status: “If individuals and
firms are freely mobile and can choose among a number of jurisdictions, they will shop for the jurisdiction that offers their most41
preferred policy package of public goods, regulations and tax rates.”
III. FEDERALISM AT THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Decline of Federalism
Essentially, only two major federalism decisions came down from
42
the Court between 1937 and 1986: Oregon v. Mitchell, which was overturned by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, and National League of Cities
43
v. Usery, later overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
44
Authority. Thus, for a half century, and throughout the terms of the
Warren and Burger Courts, federalism was largely a forgotten issue.
Prior to 1937, however, the Court was far more willing to scrutinize
the overreaching of federal power and its infringement on state
45
autonomy.

There are critics of this interstate competition. These critics see competition as
being a destructive force. For instance, it used to be thought that competition for
industry would cause states to lower environmental standards, “leading to a destructive ‘race to the bottom,’ preventable only by the federalization of environmental
regulation.” Levinson, supra note 25, at 946. Indeed, this would be the course expected if states were seen as concerned exclusively with industrial growth. Id. at 946–
47. However, because state residents value the environment, along with industry,
state governments have been found not to maximize industrial growth at the expense
of all other concerns, but to balance the benefits of industrial growth with the costs
of pollution. Id. at 947.
41
See Levinson, supra note 25, at 945.
42
400 U.S. 112 (1970).
43
426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
44
469 U.S. 528 (1985); Steven G. Calabresi, Separation of Powers and the Rehnquist
Court: The Centrality of Clinton v. City of New York, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 80 (2004).
45
See Desai, supra note 35, at 115 (noting the Court’s willingness in the context of
Congress’s taxing power). A dual sovereignty model of federalism prevailed from
1789 until the New Deal. WALKER, supra note 1, at 24. This dual sovereignty envisions an equal distribution of power between the state and federal levels of government and, according to some scholars, constitutes “the essential federalist feature of
the Constitution.” Id. at 23.
From Reconstruction to the New Deal, courts “continued to cite the Ninth
Amendment in conjunction with the Tenth as one of the twin guardians of state
autonomy.” Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 597, 601 (2005). Both Amendments “serve as barriers against the expansion of
federal power.” Id. at 602. Although initially used to resist President Roosevelt’s efforts to regulate the national economy, both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
ended up being “reduced to no more than truisms” by the New Deal constitutional
revolution. Id.
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During the nineteenth century and throughout the early twentieth, the Court adhered to a federalist vision, under which it “made
substantial use of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on congressional
46
power.” But after 1937, the Court switched positions, adopting a na47
tionalist model. In the wake of the New Deal, the expansion of federal powers increasingly eroded the Tenth Amendment protections,
and the Court from 1937 to roughly the 1990s “served generally as a
48
major force for centripetalism.” During that time, not one federal
law was held to exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, and
49
only one federal law was ruled to violate the Tenth Amendment.
The year 1937 is seen as a transformational year in the Court’s
approach to the exertion of national power; in that year, President
Roosevelt sent to Congress a bill that would authorize him to appoint
one new Supreme Court justice for each sitting justice who had
served ten years or more and had not retired within six months after
50
his seventieth birthday. Under this “court-packing” plan, the num51
ber of Supreme Court justices was to be raised to fifteen. Whether
the Court was influenced by this bill and its likely passage cannot be
known for sure; but shortly thereafter, the Court began upholding
New Deal legislation of the kind that had previously been struck
down. Initiating a new era of constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court endorsed a permanent enlargement in the scope of
52
federal power, at the expense of the states. Under this relaxed posture toward congressional power, the Court would uphold a wide
range of statutes over the next fifty years, including congressional

46

Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 8 (2000). For
instance, the Court ruled that a congressional act banning the shipment of goods
made by child labor violated the Tenth Amendment. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251, 276 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115–16 (1941).
47
Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 8.
48
WALKER, supra note 1, at 27. Whenever the Court was presented with challenges to the expansion of national authority during this period, it “almost always
upheld these actions.” Id. Thus, the Court has been very much on the side of national authority. The chief exception to this rule is the Court’s decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which in turn proved to be aberrational.
Id.
49
Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852, overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531, 557 (1985). The Commerce Clause states that
“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art I, §8, cl. 3.
50
WALKER, supra note 1, at 95.
51
Id.
52
See, e.g., NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939); Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197 (1938).
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regulation of racial discrimination in places of public accommoda53
tion and purely local incidents of loan sharking.
During the constitutional period, the states served both as the
primary check on the central government and as the primary venue
for self-government; but during the New Deal, states appeared help54
less to address the social crisis brought on by the Great Depression.
Furthermore, the notion that the states would act as a check on the
federal government seemed irrelevant, considering the urgent need
for immediate national action. Thus, unconcerned with protecting
states from congressional overreaching, the Court in the late 1930s
55
permitted the explosion of federal regulation.
56
As an example of a pre-1937 case, United States v. Butler involved
a constitutional challenge to the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Ruling
that the power to regulate agriculture was not among Congress’s
57
enumerated powers, the Court struck down the Act.
Moreover,
“[b]ecause regulating agriculture was a power reserved exclusively to
the states, the principle of ‘dual sovereignty,’ as embodied in the
Tenth Amendment, precluded Congress” from interfering in this
58
area.
According to some commentators, “Butler represents the highwater mark of the Court’s adherence to the principles of ‘dual sovereignty.’. . . By the end of the 1936 Term, the Court had eliminated
59
most of the federalism constraints on Congress’s powers . . . .” Soon
thereafter, it was giving almost complete deference to Congress in

53

See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155–56 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261–62 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 299–301 (1964).
54
Sunstein, supra note 13, at 442.
55
For criticisms of this constitutional approach and its betrayal of the Framers’
intent, see generally Calabresi, supra note 20, at 752; Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money,
and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979); William Marshall,
American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
139 (1998); Yoo, supra note 26, at 1311.
56
297 U.S. 1 (1936).
57
Id. at 68.
58
Desai, supra note 35, at 80.
59
Id. at 89–90. Furthermore, “[t]he last time the court held that a federal tax was
a ‘regulatory’ tax exceeding Congress’s taxing power was in 1936.” Id. at 84 (referring to Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)). Carter v. Carter Coal Co. held
“that a tax . . . on coal produced by coal producers who would not ‘agree’ to
extensive regulations setting forth, among other things, wages [and] working conditions . . . could not rest upon the taxing power.” Id. at 84 n.352. The following year,
in Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937), the Court upheld a license tax on
firearms dealers. Id. at 84. Commentators have viewed Sonzinsky as a repudiation of
the pre-1937 approach. Id.
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60

any conflict with the Tenth Amendment.
In Darby, the Court
treated the Tenth Amendment not as a substantive restraint on federal power, but as simply “declaratory of the relationship between the
61
national and state governments.” To the Court, the Tenth Amend62
ment had no real constitutional role; it was merely a “truism.” The
implication of this pronouncement, however, is that the enumerated
63
powers doctrine carries no judicially enforceable power.
The Burger Court in 1976 briefly revived the Tenth Amend64
ment. In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Court struck down
federal wage and overtime requirements applying to state employees,
reasoning that the power to determine wages was an “undoubted attribute of state sovereignty” and a core governmental function “essential to [the] separate and independent existence” of state sover65
Justice Rehnquist explained that “there are attributes of
eignty.
sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be
impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative
grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the
Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that man66
ner.” Though conceding the broad Commerce Clause powers possessed by Congress, the Court nonetheless crafted a Tenth Amendment exception when the object of those powers was a state
67
government.
The “traditional governmental functions” test was
used to determine whether congressional regulation had violated the
68
Tenth Amendment. The difficulty with this test, however, was in defining the specific areas of state activity that were vital for maintaining
and protecting state sovereignty. It was a difficulty that contributed

60

See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125–26 (1941) (holding that
Congress could ban the transportation of goods manufactured by firms whose employees’ wages and hours did not meet the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards
Act).
61
Id. at 124.
62
Id.
63
Bybee, supra note 15, at 557–59.
64
426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
65
Id. at 845, 852 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66
Id. at 845.
67
Bybee, supra note 15, at 558. The Court recognized that although Congress’s
Commerce Clause power is plenary, the Constitution limits that power insofar as it is
used to regulate the states. Id.; Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842.
68
Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851–52.
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to the overruling of National League of Cities by Garcia v. San Antonio
69
Metropolitan Transit Authority.
In Garcia, the Court effectively abandoned the attempt to shield
70
the states from intrusive federal regulation. Even though the federal law at issue in Garcia dictating certain wage and hour conditions
to the states was similar to the law in National League of Cities, the
71
Court upheld it.
In so ruling, the Court “eliminated the Tenth
Amendment as a viable defense for the states against federal intervention,” which in turn left the states without any constitutional defenses
72
against national regulation of state governmental functions.
According to the Court, any limits on the federal government’s power
73
to invade state functions had to come from the political process.
Critics, however, saw this decision as abandoning a fundamental constitutional doctrine, as well as relegating states to a “trivial role” in the
74
constitutional system.
In his Garcia opinion, Justice Blackmun adopted a view of statefederal sovereignty contrary to the view that prevailed during the
constitutional period. He noted that the “sovereignty of the States is
limited by the Constitution itself,” and that whatever sovereign authority the states possess is “only to the extent that the Constitution
has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those
75
powers to the Federal Government.” This narrow view of state sovereignty contradicted the views of James Madison. According to
Madison, the “powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
Federal Government, are few and defined,” while those retained by
76
the states are “numerous and indefinite.” Madison further asserted
that the “powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the
69

469 U.S. at 531 (holding that Congress could subject the states to generally applicable employment regulations enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause).
70
Id. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting).
71
Id. at 555–56 (majority opinion).
72
Michael P. Lee, How Clear is Clear?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 259 (1998). In Garcia, the Court found the “traditional governmental functions” test to be unworkable.
469 U.S. at 546–47. Contrary to Usery, the Garcia Court found that it could no longer
distinguish between states acting as governments and states acting as proprietors.
Bybee, supra note 15, at 559.
73
The Court noted that it was extremely difficult to define the nature and content of any restrictions imposed by the Tenth Amendment. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547.
For this reason, the Court concluded that the role and independence of the states
was to be protected not by judicial enforcement of the Tenth Amendment but by the
very nature of the political process, in which state actors played a prominent and influential role. Id. at 550.
74
WALKER, supra note 1, at 187.
75
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548, 549.
76
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
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objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, lib77
erties and properties of the people.”
78
Extending its Garcia ruling, the Court in South Carolina v. Baker
held that the Tenth Amendment limits “are structural, not substantive—i.e., that States must find their protection from congressional
79
regulation through the national political process.” Although the
Court in Baker acknowledged that “extraordinary defects” in the political process might actually trigger some Tenth Amendment protec80
tions, it failed to explain what might constitute such a defect.
B. The Rehnquist Court’s Revival of Federalism
1.

The Tenth Amendment Decisions

According to many commentators, the Rehnquist Court has
81
made its most significant accomplishment in the area of federalism.
After almost sixty years of dormancy, federalism made a constitu-

77

Id.
485 U.S. 505 (1988).
79
Id. at 512. The nationalist-orientation of the Court could also be seen in its
decisions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a federal cause of action for violations of federal rights under color of state law. In 1978, the Court reversed a previous ruling that a municipality could not be sued under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978) (overturning Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961)). Later, in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980), the Court
held that in § 1983 suits municipalities may not assert good faith as a defense. In the
area of municipal antitrust liability, the Burger Court further handicapped states and
municipalities by imposing on them various types of antitrust liability. Up until the
1970s, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act had been applied to private parties and corporations. But in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Court applied the Act to the public
sector, finding various municipalities liable for antitrust violations. See City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cmty. Commc’ns Co., Inc. v. City
of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (ruling that the city of Boulder’s moratorium on cable television expansion was subject to antitrust scrutiny).
80
Baker, 485 U.S. at 512. On the political front, federalism was also being affected by changes in the political party structure. Up until the 1960s, political parties
had generally served as a decentralizing force, focusing debate and political conflict
at the state and local levels. WALKER, supra note 1, at 32. However, centralizing
forces have significantly eroded state and local power and influence in the parties.
Id. Thus, national party organizations are now “stronger than they have ever been.”
Id. at 33.
81
Although, one scholar has described the Court’s federalism decisions as just
“puppy federalism” (as analogized to puppy love, being a mere distant imitation of
the real thing). MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 56 (2003) (citing
Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 38 (2001)).
78
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82

tional comeback in the 1990s. Describing this federalism revolution,
two noted constitutional scholars have written:
Federalism has become the defining issue of the Rehnquist
Court. To the extent that its five Justice conservative majority has
changed American constitutional law, its reasoning in re-defining
the balance of power between the national government and the
states will likely prove to be what the Rehnquist court is best
83
known for.

According to another commentator, the Rehnquist Court “has exercised judicial review aggressively, issuing decisions that have reinvigo84
rated the doctrine of federalism and restored power to the states.”
In the past decade or so, “there has been a slow but steady trend towards curbing the power of the federal government under the limitations of the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amend85
ment.”
Since the 1990s, the Court has “assumed an aggressive stance in
safeguarding states from perceived overreaching by the federal gov86
ernment.” In striking down various federal actions, the Court has
“revived the effort to demarcate proper spheres of authority between
the federal and state governments and to provide constitutional heft
to federalism after a period where the constitutional boundaries were
87
lowered.”
According to the New York Times, a “hallmark of the
82

The Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions have been described as the “new
federalism.” Casey L. Westover, Structural Interpretation and the New Federalism: Finding
the Proper Balance Between State Sovereignty and Federal Supremacy, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 693,
725 (2005). This “new federalism” attempts to counter the long drift toward an imbalanced system greatly favoring the national government over the states. It also
seeks to recognize the fact that for most of American history the states have been the
chief architects “of the welter of servicing, financial, institutional, and jurisdictional
arrangements” of the public sector. WALKER, supra note 1, at 249. States have also
“provided the means by which most of domestic U.S. governance is conducted and
nearly all domestic policies are implemented.” Id.
83
Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause after Morrison,
25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 843, 844 (2000).
84
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653, 659
(2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)).
85
Robert Ward Shaw, Comment, The States, Balanced Budgets, and Fundamental
Shifts in Federalism, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1195, 1217 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
86
A. Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297, 305
(2003).
87
Id. Besides its more restrictive interpretation of enumerated powers, the
Rehnquist Court on occasion prevented Congress from creating new civil rights that
might trump state laws or policies under the guise of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court ruled that Congress could not require the states to
give more protections to religious exercise than the Constitution gave. 521 U.S. 507,
534–36 (1997). The Boerne ruling was later relied on to overturn other acts of Con-
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Rehnquist Court has been a re-examination of the country’s most basic constitutional arrangements, resulting in decisions that demanded
a new respect for the sovereignty of the states and placed correspond88
ing restrictions on the powers of Congress.”
The Rehnquist Court waged its federalism revolution through
three different constitutional approaches. It expanded state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. It narrowed the
scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. And it revived the
Tenth Amendment as a limit on congressional power.
89
In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that the
federalism principles contained in the Tenth Amendment prohibited
Congress from enacting legislation forcing state legislatures to admin90
ister a federal regulatory program. At issue were provisions of the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (LRWP Act), which required
states to either adopt a federal regulatory program or be held finan91
cially responsible for damages as owners of the waste. In striking
down this law, the Court held that by failing to provide the states with
the choice not to regulate, the law “crossed the line distinguishing
encouragement from coercion,” thus violating the Tenth Amend92
ment. Finding that the LRWP Act was an attempt by Congress to
93
use the States as “implements of regulation,” the Court ruled that

gress. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,
the Court overturned a federal statute making states liable to private parties for patent infringement and violations of the Lanham Act. 527 U.S. 627, 637–48 (1999). In
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), and Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), the Court prohibited Congress, under
the guise of the Fourteenth Amendment, from exposing states to private lawsuits alleging age and disability discrimination under federal law.
88
Linda Greenhouse, The Rehnquist Court and Its Imperiled States’ Rights Legacy, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2005, § 4, at 3, available at 2005 WLNR 9303554. Despite this attempt
by the Court to strengthen state sovereignty, however, not all decisions went in favor
of the states. In Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005), for instance, the
Court upheld the power of Congress to ban the use of marijuana for medical purposes, even in states that permitted it.
89
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
90
Id. at 188.
91
Id. at 175–77. The act stated that any state that failed to clean up its nuclear
waste by 1986 would be deemed to be responsible for the waste and would be liable
for any harms it had caused. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (2000), invalidated by
New York, 505 U.S. 144.
92
New York, 505 U.S. at 175, 149–54. In explaining its decision, the Court first
noted that unlike previous Tenth Amendment cases, New York did not involve a law
of general applicability. Id. at 160–61. Thus, the Court found that the law attempted
to regulate states directly, rather than through the impact of generally applicable
laws. Id. at 176–77.
93
Id. at 161.
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the Tenth Amendment is violated when Congress “commandeers”
the states by forcing them to enact or administer a federal regulatory
94
program. Although the LRWP Act left the states with the choice of
accepting title to hazardous waste or regulating according to the
mandates of the Act, this choice was constitutionally deficient since
the first option commandeered state governments for federal purposes, while the second basically mandated that state governments
95
implement specific federal legislation. By infringing on the core of
state sovereignty, the Act, according to Justice O’Connor, was “inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by
96
the Constitution.”
In Printz v. United States, the Court extended its ruling in New
York by holding that the Tenth Amendment forbade Congress from
enforcing certain provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Preven97
tion Act. The Brady Act required state law enforcement personnel
to participate in a federal regulatory program by conducting background checks and processing handgun applications before issuing
98
any firearm permits. As it had done in New York, the Court in Printz
ruled that “the Federal Government may not compel the States to
implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory pro99
grams.” According to the Court, the federal government could “neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers . . . to administer or enforce a
federal regulatory program,” since such commands violated the “con100
stitutional system of dual sovereignty.”
Examining the issue from an historical perspective, Justice
Scalia’s decision focused on the “structure of the Constitution,” see101
ing in it an “essential postulate” of state sovereignty. In laying out a
view of state sovereignty much broader than the view given by Justice
Blackmun in Garcia, Justice Scalia wrote that although “the states surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they
retained a ‘residuary and inviolable sovereignty’” that is “reflected
94

Id. at 176.
Id. at 175–77.
96
New York, 505 U.S. at 177.
97
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
98
Id. at 902–04.
99
Id. at 925. The Brady Act was therefore unconstitutional because it forced state
executive officials to enforce federal laws. Id. at 933–35.
100
Id. at 935. Justice Scalia found that Congress had essentially conscripted state
and local governments to carry out a congressional mandate, and that this conscription encroached on state sovereignty. Id.
101
Printz, 521 U.S. at 918.
95
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102

throughout the Constitution’s text.” According to Scalia, the Constitution embodies a “dual sovereignty” that prohibits the federal
103
government from acting “upon and through the States.”
2.

Commerce Power Limitations

In two major Commerce Clause cases, in which individuals challenged the exercise of federal power, the Rehnquist Court held that
Congress lacked the authority to intrude upon matters of state and
104
local law enforcement. In each case, the Court held that Congress
105
It also
could exercise only those powers enumerated in Article I.
narrowed the scope of Congress’s Article I Commerce Clause powers,
holding that Congress may only regulate economic activity that has a
106
substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Through such rulings,
the Court sought to curtail broad-reaching congressional regulations
107
that would be incompatible with “our dual system of government.”
In United States v. Lopez, for the first time since the New Deal, the
Supreme Court nullified a congressional enactment under the
108
Commerce Clause. That enactment outlawed the possession of any
109
firearm within 1000 feet of a school.
Striking down this prohibition, the Court held that the possession of guns near schools was not
an activity constituting commerce and hence was not within the scope
110
of the commerce power.
In so ruling, the Court restricted the
scope of the Commerce Clause to the regulation of those activities

102

Id. at 918–19 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; art. IV, §§ 2–4; art. V).
Id.
104
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995).
105
Although the Court may have revived judicial review of the Commerce Clause,
it continues “to construe the Spending Clause to provide nearly a blank check for
any spending that Congress chooses to undertake and to permit Congress to impose
regulatory conditions that may parallel those barred by its Commerce Clause jurisprudence.” McGinnis & Somin, supra note 39, at 115 (footnote omitted). See also Sabri v. United States, 540 U.S. 600 (2004) (upholding the imposition of various conditions on the granting of federal funds to states); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203
(1987).
106
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59.
107
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
108
Prior to 1937, the Court had struck down an array of congressional Commerce
Clause enactments, usually on the grounds that those enactments undermined the
police power of the states. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). But in 1937, the
Court reversed course and substantially expanded Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
109
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
110
Id. at 561.
103
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111

having a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce. It also recognized that some areas of “historical” state powers, including family
law, criminal law enforcement, and education are beyond Congress’s
112
power under the Commerce Clause.
Continuing in the Lopez vein, the Court in United States v. Morrison struck down the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against
113
Women Act. The Court ruled that the commerce power can apply
114
only to an “economic endeavor,” and that gender-motivated violent
115
crimes “are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.” According to the Court, the Violence Against Women Act regulated not
economic behavior such as commercial transactions, but conduct that
116
has traditionally been left to state law.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote, the Constitution “requires a distinction between what is truly
117
national and what is truly local.” Thus, contrary to Garcia, the Morrison opinion reflected a “deep-seated respect for states as sover118
eigns.”
3.

State Sovereign Immunity

The third focus of the Rehnquist Court regarding the doctrinal
development of the new federalism was the expansion of state sovereign immunity. The Court did this in connection with lawsuits
against states in both state and federal courts. Through its Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has indicated that state sover119
eign immunity from private suits is critical to state autonomy.
120
In Alden v. Maine, the Court addressed suits in state court, ruling that sovereign immunity prevented Congress from compelling
121
states to defend federal claims in state courts. In his majority decision, Justice Kennedy discussed the need to protect state sovereignty
from nonconsensual suits:
111

Id. at 565, 558–59.
Id. at 564.
113
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000).
114
Id. at 611.
115
Id. at 613. Thus, the Court held that the civil damages provision of the Violence Against Women Act exceeded the scope of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 617–
19.
116
Id. at 617–18.
117
Id.
118
Grey, supra note 35, at 497.
119
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 59 (1996) (rejecting the
assertion that Congress, through its Article I powers, could subject the states to private federal suits).
120
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
121
Id. at 758–60.
112
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The federal system established by our Constitution preserves the
sovereign status of the States in two ways. First, it reserves to them
a substantial portion of the Nation’s primary sovereignty, together
with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status. . . .
Second, even as to matters within the competence of the National Government, the constitutional design secures the founding generation’s rejection of “the concept of a central government that would act upon and through the States” in favor of “a
system in which the State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people—who were, in Hamil122
ton’s words, ‘the only proper objects of government.’”

Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion relied heavily on the general
state sovereignty principle, which he argued pervades the constitutional text: “[S]overeign immunity derives not from the Eleventh
Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution it123
self.”
124
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the Court continued this expansion of state immunity. Addressing the issue of whether states can
be sued by their employees under federal laws prohibiting age discrimination, the Court held that Congress exceeded its powers when
it abrogated the states’ immunity from suits brought under the Age
125
Discrimination in Employment Act. And in a later case, the Court
ruled that Congress again intruded upon state sovereign immunity
when it enacted Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
126
1990.
The Court has also used the Eleventh Amendment to immunize
states from suits in federal court. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flor127
ida the Court overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., which gave
128
In
Congress broad powers to override the Eleventh Amendment.
Seminole Tribe, the Court substantially restricted the power of Con129
gress to authorize suits against state governments.
Relying heavily

122

Id. at 714 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919–20 (1997)).
Id. at 728.
124
528 U.S. 62 (2000).
125
Id. at 91.
126
See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
127
517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996).
128
491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
129
517 U.S. at 65–66. Seminole Tribe held that Congress did not have the power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity when legislating pursuant to its Article I powers.
Id. at 72.
123
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on the Eleventh Amendment, the Court referred to it as the textual
130
embodiment of the principle of state sovereign immunity.
These sovereign immunity decisions indicate the Court’s belief
that such immunity is critical to protecting the states as autonomous
131
sovereigns. According to Professor Althouse, the real concern “is to
protect the states as independently functioning government institutions by sparing them the impact of accumulated liability for their
132
past violations of law.” In a more recent expansion of the sovereign
immunity doctrine, the Court held that sovereign immunity also ap133
plied to adjudications in federal administrative agencies.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF FEDERALISM
A. A Structural Provision
Through its recent federalism decisions, the Court is “resurrecting and restoring a [constitutional structure] that it erroneously
134
A diverse and decentralized
abandoned in the years after 1937.”
governmental structure, divided between the layers of state, local and
nation, offers an array of benefits, the most compelling of which is
135
the protection of individual liberty.
The Constitution’s embodi130

Id. at 64. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the Court held that state governments cannot be sued for patent violations
in federal court. 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999).
131
Grey, supra note 35, at 500.
132
Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court’s New Federalism, 68 U.
CIN. L. REV. 245, 265 (2000). But not all Court decisions on state immunity have
gone in favor of the states. See Nevada v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding the
ability of state employees to sue under the Family and Medical Leave Act); Tennessee
v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding the application of the Americans With Disabilities Act to state courthouses). By ruling that states could be sued for failing to
make their courthouses accessible, the Court rejected the states’ claim of constitutional immunity from suit. Also, in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 540 U.S. 461 (2004), the Court affirmed the authority
of the federal Environmental Protection Agency over state regulators, despite the
dissent of Justice Kennedy on federalism grounds. Id. at 502; id. at 502–03 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
133
See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751–53 (2002)
(using the Alden reasoning to derive sovereign immunity from the general principle
of state sovereignty).
134
Kramer, supra note 9, at 290.
135
Historically, it has been believed that individual liberty would be served by dividing and decentralizing government power. As the Court explained in New York v.
United States: federalism “‘secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.’” 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). The Court also stated that a
“‘healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will re-
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ment of the structural principles of federalism is designed not just to
create a workable government but to create one that protects indi136
vidual rights. Federalism works in combination with another structural provision of the Constitution—the separation of powers—to
produce a system with two different levels of checks and balances:
one existing between the national and state governments, and the
other between the three branches of the federal government. This
system reflects what Madison called the Constitution’s “double secu137
rity” for individual rights.
Federalism reflects a structural aspect of the constitutional
scheme because it deals not with a specific power or right enjoyed by
a specific actor, but with the organization of the American republic
138
and the relationship between governmental units.
Federalism
represents those limitations on government power that are both explicit in the text of the Constitution and implicit in the structure of
the Constitution—a structure based on the different spheres of fed139
eral and state authority.
The system of dual sovereignty between
national and state governments was designed largely to create a gov140
ernment that would protect the liberty of its citizens.
duce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.’” Id. (quoting Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
136
Amar, supra note 2, at 1426. An advantage of federalism is that people of different views can gather in different states with different policies. In a way, federalism
can be seen as conducive to or even responsible for the revolution in sexual rights,
because people have been able to move to the locales most hospitable to their particular orientations or proclivities.
137
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 67 (James Madison) (Lester DeKoster ed., 1976).
The interstate competition fostered by federalism can also promote liberty. The ability of citizens to move from one state to another, to “vote with their feet . . . will discipline government in the same way in which consumer choice . . . disciplines producers.” MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD
HAPPEN 3 (1999). In this same way, the competitive system of federalism devised by
the Framers “leads to the protection of liberty” by allowing citizens to move from a
state where they feel tyrannized to one with less tyrannous laws. Calabresi, supra note
20, at 776.
138
Federalism, in other words, describes the type of governmental structure laid
out in the Constitution—a structure of state-retained powers later codified in the
Tenth Amendment. Amar, supra note 2, at 1440. The Tenth Amendment is not
about reserving power to the states so that they can administer themselves as governments, but an amendment expressing a relationship among the federal government, the states, and the people. Bybee, supra note 15, at 561.
139
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713–14 (1999) (citing both the constitutional
text and the implications of the “constitutional design” as the legal basis for federalism).
140
See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990); see also Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (“This separation of the [federal and state governments] is
one of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51,
at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that governmental
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To the Framers, the primary justification of federalism was not
diversity or state competition, but the role of the states as guardians
141
against possible federal tyranny. By diluting the power of the centralized national government, federalism restricts the opportunities
for the abuse of power. Furthermore, by maintaining a separate governmental watchdog layer in the states, federalism provides a built-in
mechanism to combat any overreaching by the national govern142
ment.
The Framers believed that the states could mount popular
143
uprisings against any tyrannical abuses by the national government.
Alexander Hamilton argued that individuals who felt their rights violated by the central government could use the state governments “as
144
the instrument of redress.” Indeed, the prevailing expectation during the constitutional period was that “when one’s rivals or enemies
were in control of the central government, one was prone to savor
145
states’ rights”
In The Federalist Nos. 9 and 51, Hamilton makes a clear distinction
146
between a free government and a republican government. Whereas
free government focuses exclusively on securing specified individual
rights, republican government tries to achieve political freedom as a

power “is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people.”).
141
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 179–180 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing that the states “will in all possible contingencies afford
complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority”);
see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION xiii
(1998) (arguing that bolstering the states as bulwarks against federal tyranny was the
primary motivation behind the adoption of the Bill of Rights).
142
The Framers believed that the states would serve to check any encroachments
by the national government on the liberties of the people. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST
NO. 51, at 322–23 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
143
Kramer, supra note 9, at 215. Similarly, the modern Court’s resurgent interest
in preserving federalism is driven by a “concern for individual liberty.” William H.
Pryor, Madison’s Double Security, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1167, 1177 (2002). As Justice
O’Connor stated, the Constitution “does not protect the sovereignty of States for the
benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities,” but rather
“for the protection of individuals.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181
(1992).
144
THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
145
FORREST MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO,
1776–1876, at 48 (2000).
146
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 9, 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (referencing the distinction between free governments and republican governments).
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147

means to securing individual freedom. In choosing the latter, the
Framers saw the structure of government as the best protection of in148
Their objective was to design the proper governdividual rights.
149
mental arrangements that would preserve liberty. To the Framers,
“the primary safeguards against government tyranny were architec150
Infringements on liberty caused by a potentially tyrannical
tural.”
national government could best be prevented by state governments
151
standing “ready to rally their citizens and lead them in opposition.”
For a century and a half, the Framers’ commitment to federalism
persevered in constitutional doctrine. But the Framers’ view of protecting liberty through a limited and divided government was largely
abandoned by the New Deal reformers, who called upon a powerful
and activist central government to combat the problems of the Great
152
Depression.
Unlike the Framers, the New Dealers believed they
could preserve liberty strictly through the judiciary’s enforcement of
153
specified individual freedoms.
As a result of the transformations brought on by the New Deal, a
constitutional compromise or settlement was reached. In order to
sustain the sweeping New Deal legislation, judicial review of federal154
ism issues more or less ended. Congress was given great deference
to enact the kind of legislation that would have previously been
155
judged a violation of the federalism doctrine. However, this abandonment of federalism undercut one of the most fundamental requisites of individual liberty. To compensate for this erasure of constitutional protection, the Court made a compromise: although it would
retreat from reviewing federalism issues, it would intensify its review
of individual rights issues. Larry Kramer calls this the New Deal “settlement,” in which the Court decided to enforce rigorously a selective
set of substantive individual rights while deferring to Congress in
147

Bradford P. Wilson, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review, in SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 63, 68 (Bradford P. Wilson & Peter W. Schramm
eds., 1994).
148
Id.
149
WALKER, supra note 1, at 56. A federalist structure would help protect “‘the
rights of every class of citizens.’” Id. at 57.
150
Levinson, supra note 25, at 919.
151
Id. at 938. But this ability was possible only if courts preserved the constitutional structure that gave state governments considerable influence and leverage
over federal officials to prevent federal overreaching. Id.
152
See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the
States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 483–84 (1997).
153
See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 424.
154
See cases and discussion supra notes 52, 59, 60.
155
See cases and discussion supra notes 52, 59, 60.
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structural matters, such as federalism and separation of powers. Ju157
dicial passivity in one area would be offset by activism in another.
Thus, a deferential posture in connection with federalism and separation of powers coincided with the rise of a new version of substantive
due process underlying a new judicial assertiveness in civil liberties
cases.
As early as 1937, the Court articulated a “preferred-freedoms”
approach calling for heightened constitutional protection of individual rights “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
158
to be ranked as fundamental.” A year later, in footnote four to his
159
opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co., Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone argued that the Court should protect the personal rights outlined in the Bill of Rights more zealously than property or economic
160
rights. It was this doctrine, which suggested a greater protection of
individual rights than of any other constitutional provisions, that provided the foundation on which the Court would later construct the
161
right to privacy.
This heightened protection of individual rights
also provided a substitute for judicial review of structural issues, and
led to a gradual incorporation of the Bill of Rights guarantees into
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, thereby generating a new body of substantive due proc162
ess in the civil liberties area.
156

LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 219–20 (2004). Because of this “settlement,” federalism became a
dead doctrine until the Rehnquist Court. WALKER, supra note 1, at 96.
157
WALKER, supra note, 1 at 97.
158
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
159
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
160
Id. at 152–53 n.4 (“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.”).
161
Donald H.J. Hermann, Pulling the Fig Leaf Off the Right of Privacy: Sex and the
Constitution, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 945 (2005).
162
WALKER, supra note 1, at 96. The preferred status given to individual rights
over structural matters, however, is not accorded to property rights. The court seems
concerned with individual rights only when they arise within the context of some
kind of prohibited discrimination. Thus, courts have allowed the expansion of instances in which the government can commandeer private property through the
process of eminent domain. See, e.g., Mary Massaron Ross, Public Use: Does County of
Wayne v. Hathcock Signal a Revival of the Public Use Limit to the Taking of Private Property?, 37 URB. LAW. 243 (2005). Immigration and naturalization cases present yet another example of the preferred position given review of individual rights issues.
Normally, the Court grants deference to Congress on immigration and naturalization
matters, which fall within the field of foreign affairs, but an exception is made in
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The civil rights movement solidified the transformation in constitutional approaches to the preservation of liberty: from relying on
the structural provisions of the Constitution to using the courts to en163
force substantive individual rights.
But this transformation essentially turned majority rule and individual liberty into antagonists. It
exalted the protection of individual rights as the primary purpose of
164
constitutional law.
Lost was the notion that if government power
was constrained it could not infringe on liberty. Lost was the belief
that a limited government of checks and balances could provide a
lasting and supportive environment for individual liberty. Instead,
the Court focused near exclusively on protecting specific, substantive
rights, carving them out of and immunizing them from the political
process.
In the legal culture of the late twentieth century, judicial review
by an undemocratic court came to be seen as the only way to protect
165
civil liberties. Individual rights required judicial supremacy and exclusivity. But it was only after the New Deal and the judicial activism
of the Warren Court that America came to rely only on the judiciary
166
for the protection of individual rights.
“Only during the past two
generations have lawyers and judges succeeded in placing judicial re167
view at the center” of the protection of individual liberty.
The bifurcated pattern of judicial review that resulted from the
New Deal “settlement”‘ was revealed in a 1978 study conducted by
168
Professor Arthur Hellman.
Professor Hellman found that during
the six terms from 1971 through 1976, forty-three percent of the Supreme Court’s cases involved the principal issue of individual

cases involving individuals asserting various types of due process challenges to Immigration and Naturalization Services orders. See generally Melissa A. Flynn, Case Comment, Separation of Powers: Permissive Judicial Review or Invasion of Congressional Power?:
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), 54 FLA. L. REV. 989 (2002). In such cases, the
courts again tend to ignore separation of powers issues and rule in favor of specific
individual rights.
163
Levinson, supra note 25, at 971.
164
Id. at 972.
165
Hulsebosch, supra note 84, at 658. Much of the legal academy favors the relatively recent norm of expansive readings of the Bill of Rights. Saikrishna B. Prakash,
Branches Behaving Badly: The Predictable and Often Desirable Consequences of the Separation
of Powers, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 543, 546 (2003). Substantive individual rights
appear to be the only place where the legal academy favors limitations on government.
166
Hulsebosch, supra note 84, at 660.
167
Id. at 662.
168
Arthur D. Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of
1925: The Plenary Docket in the 1970’s, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1711 (1978).
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169

rights. Compared with the 383 decisions involving individual rights
during this period, the Court handed down only eight decisions in
which the principal issue was either a question of federalism or
whether Congress had exceeded its constitutionally delegated pow170
ers.
Other scholars and commentators have documented this skewed
focus of the Court that greatly favors individual rights cases over fed171
eralism or separation of powers cases.
Mary Ann Glendon argues
that prior to the 1950s the principal focus of constitutional law was
not on personal liberty, but on the division of authority between the
states and the federal government and the allocation of powers
172
among the branches of the federal government. A half-century ago,
the Court saw far fewer cases involving individual rights claims; today,
however, those kinds of cases make up the bulk of the Court’s consti173
tutional workload.
The judicial preference for substantive individual rights over
structural matters can presently be seen through cases involving the
174
due process rights of alleged enemy combatants. In Rasul v. Bush,
the Court addressed the issue of whether habeas corpus should be
available to foreign nationals detained abroad in connection with the
175
U.S. war on terror.
This inquiry, however, triggered the larger issues of what due process rights are possessed by those accused of being enemy combatants and whether the detention of enemy combat169

Id. at 1741. The number of individual rights cases was nearly double the number the Court had heard during the 1959–1964 period. Id. at 1750.
170
Id. at 1761.
171
This skewed focus is evident in the Court’s handling of deportation orders of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001). Even though Congress has exclusive power to legislate in the area of immigration and naturalization, U.S. CONST. art I, §8, cl. 4, and even though Congress has
delegated some of those powers to the executive branch (the INS), the Court has
taken a judicially active and intrusive stance to immigration matters that affect or involve issues of individual rights. Rather than showing deference to Congress and to
separation of powers concerns, the Court has actively reviewed and scrutinized congressional laws dealing with the INS’s detention of deportable aliens. See Zadvyas,
533 U.S. at 682.
172
MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 4 (1991) (arguing that the traditional theory was that individual freedom
was protected mainly through these structural features of our political regime).
173
Id. at 5. As the Supreme Court began in the 1950s to expand the constitutional protection of a broad range of personal rights, judicial review was used, instead of democratic processes, to protect individual rights and check majoritarian
rule. Id. at 38. The great expansion of personal liberties and civil rights began in the
post-World War II period. Id. at 163.
174
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
175
Id. at 475.
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ants falls under the sole authority of the President and Congress—
176
hence falling outside the scope of judicial review. Even though the
great weight of constitutional precedent indicated that military de177
tainees did not possess due process rights and that military detainees could not use habeas corpus, the Court in Rasul held that U.S.
178
courts do have jurisdiction to hear such petitions. Thus, Rasul provides an embodiment of the post-1937 judicial trend: rigorously reviewing matters of substantive individual rights, while largely ignoring
structural issues. In essence, the conflict in Rasul was a separation of
powers dispute between the executive’s authority in military affairs
and the judiciary’s interest in protecting substantive individual rights,
with the Court elevating the latter over the former.
179
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court likewise held that a U.S. citizen
detained as an enemy combatant (captured in Afghanistan while
fighting with a Taliban military unit) could not only challenge the
circumstances of his detention before a court, but could present ar180
guments against his detention.
In dissent, Justice Thomas argued
that the constitutional authority of the President to wage war and
protect the security interests of America took priority over the per181
ceived authority of the courts. According to Justice Thomas, decisions regarding detained enemy combatants are decisions given ex176

See Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 486 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (“Where a power has been committed to a particular Branch of the
Government in the text of the Constitution, the balance already has been struck by
the Constitution itself.”). The Bush administration argued that the power to detain
enemy combatants was inherent in the commander-in-chief’s power and thus should
not be subject to a balancing of the competing constitutional interests of other
branches. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475.
177
See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that the U.S. civil
courts have no jurisdiction over non-citizen enemy fighters captured and held in foreign territory); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942) (denying leave to file petitions
for habeas corpus when several suspected saboteurs (including one U.S. citizen)
sought review of their detentions). As Justice Jackson explained in Eisentrager: “Executive power over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by litigation, has been
deemed, throughout our history, essential to wartime security.” Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
at 774; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
(holding that the President should have broad latitude in the context of foreign policy).
178
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473.
179
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
180
Id. at 509 (holding that due process demands that “an enemy combatant be
given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before
a neutral decisionmaker”).
181
Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the subject “detention falls
squarely within the Federal Government’s war powers, and we lack the expertise and
capacity to second-guess that decision. As such, petitioners’ habeas challenge should
fail . . . .”).
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clusively by the Constitution to Congress and the President; nowhere
does the Constitution give authority to the courts over war-related
182
matters.
B. Judicial Balancing of Structure and Individual Rights
Within the constitutional scheme, there has emerged an inverse
relationship between the enforcement of substantive individual rights
and that of structural provisions such as federalism and separation of
powers. As the courts have abandoned the latter, they have had to intensify the former. In the words of one commentator, “[t]he decline
of federalism and the rise of judicial supremacy, in short, are the op183
posite sides of a single coin.”
When the Court ceases to protect the kind of governmental
structure designed to guard individual liberty, then only the judiciary
is left to act as the guardian of liberty—and it does so by carving out
and rigidly enforcing individual substantive rights. This practice of
strict review of individual rights cases and lenient review of structural
184
cases came into full flower during the 1960s, when the Warren and
Burger Courts effected a constitutional revolution in many areas of
185
substantive individual rights, including criminal justice, race dis186
187
188
crimination, the First Amendment, abortion, the rights of
189
190
191
women, the death penalty, and procedural due process.

182

Id. Justice Scalia argued that the Court’s decision took the Court out of the
modest and limited role it held in a democratic society. Id. at 577 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183
Michael Uhlmann, Wretched Judicial Excess, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 2002, at 49 (reviewing ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2001)).
184
Michael B. Rappaport, It’s the O’Connor Court: A Brief Discussion of Some Critiques
of the Rehnquist Court and Their Implications for Administrative Law, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
369, 375 (2004) (“[T]he two-tiered approach of vigorous judicial review concerning
individual rights, but deferential review of structural matters, is of relatively recent
vintage.”).
185
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating new procedural safeguards
for criminal defendants subjected to custodial interrogation).
186
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage).
187
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (limiting the liability of
defendants in a defamation action).
188
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a constitutional right to abortion).
189
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down gender-based discrimination).
190
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (ruling that the death penalty
as applied under the Alabama statute at issue was unconstitutional), superseded by statute, ALA. CODE § 13-11-9 (1975), repealed by ALA. CODE § 13A-5-57 (1982).
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Today, the Supreme Court is widely viewed as the sole guarantor
192
of individual liberties. But in the Framers’ view, the primary security for rights lay in the Constitution’s structural features, such as federalism. Contrary to the claim that individual rights should be en193
forced more strictly than structural provisions, other scholars have
shown that the Framers did intend significant review of structural
194
matters.
During the constitutional period, the protection of individual liberty through judicial review of substantive individual rights
was rarely mentioned, primarily because the Framers relied more on
the structural provisions of the Constitution to check government
abuses than on judicially created rights that serve as trump-cards on
195
the democratic process.
Contemporary conventional wisdom in constitutional law holds
that individual rights are more in need of judicial protection than are
the structural provisions of the Constitution. But there is good reason to think that just the opposite is true. Because citizens are often
more immediately focused on their substantive liberties than on federalism, “judicial review may be more necessary to restrain government agents from violating the Constitution’s structural provisions
196
than provisions relating to individual rights.”
For this reason,
courts should enforce the federalism provisions of the Constitution
“no less than they do the Constitution’s individual rights provi197
sions.” As one commentator has recognized, democratic freedoms
are “inevitably conditioned by the entire institutional structure within
198
which these [freedoms] exist.” Indeed, the way in which federalism
acts as a guardian of individual rights was illustrated by Jonah Goldberg, using the analogy of college dorms:
Imagine you’ve got ten dorms on a campus and a student population divided up into the usual coalitions: stoners, partiers, jocks,
and so forth on one side, and study geeks, exchange students . . .
on the other. A purely democratic system where all students get
191

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that a termination of welfare
benefits requires a due process hearing).
192
Uhlmann, supra note 183, at 49.
193
See KRAMER, supra note 156, at 81–82, 125 (arguing that vigorous judicial review
can occur with individual rights, but should not occur with structural matters). In
Kramer’s view, the New Deal settlement was that judicial review was legitimate in individual rights cases, but not in cases involving structural issues. Id. at 162–65.
194
Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 887, 927–81 (2003).
195
Kramer, supra note 9, at 266.
196
McGinnis & Somin, supra note 39, at 97.
197
Id. at 90.
198
Pildes, supra note 40, at 52.
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to decide dorm policy could result in the tyranny of 51 percent of
the students over 49 percent of the students. The party-hardy
crowd could pass a policy permitting loud music and keg parties
at all hours of the night. Or if the more academically rigorous
coalition won, they could ban “fun” of any kind, ever. Similarly, if
the administration imposed its own policy from above, you could
have a system that makes no one happy.
But, if you allowed each individual dorm to vote for its own policies, you could have a system where some dorms operate like
scholarly monasteries and other dorms are more fun than a pool
party at James Caan’s house. Theoretically, 100 percent of the
199
students could live the way they want.

V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHOOSING RIGHTS OVER STRUCTURE
A. A Disconnect Between Individuals and the Democratic Process
The Framers favored a structural protection for individual liberty because they did not, and could not, envision the kind of activist
judiciary needed to ensure liberty through the enforcement of a
specified set of substantive individual rights. Yet, aside from this distaste for an activist judiciary, the Framers also hinged the protection
of liberty on the structural design of the Constitution because they
saw the democratic process, with sufficient checks and balances, as
supportive of individual liberty. To the Framers, the design of government, rather than any enumerated right, constituted the individ200
ual’s primary protection from tyranny by the majority.
With federalism and separation of powers providing an internal,
structural check on the kind of government abuses that could erode
basic freedoms, a consistency and harmony was seen between individual liberty and the workings of the larger democratic society.
However, as the belief in this connection eroded over the course of
the late twentieth century, individual rights became isolated ends in
themselves, disconnected from the structural workings of the constitutional process. Consequently, the modern notion of individual
rights tends to be divorced from the larger society. Rights are characterized by an “exaggerated absoluteness, . . . hyperindividualism, . . .

199

Jonah Goldberg, Jesusland for Thee, But Not for Me, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20041201-0600332541r.
200
GLENDON, supra note 172, at 24.
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insularity, and . . . silence with respect to personal, civic, and collec201
tive responsibilities.”
By trying to protect liberty solely through the enforcement of
specified personal freedoms, the lone individual is elevated to the
202
pinnacle of the American political and constitutional scheme. The
primary legal drama of recent decades has been the expansion of individual rights. In legal education, for instance, “an intense preoccupation with the Bill of Rights and the courts tends to obscure the important roles that federalism, legislation, and separation of powers
203
still can and must play in safeguarding rights and freedom.”
Not
only are democratic values downgraded in this process, but the indi204
vidual is placed in constant conflict with the larger society.
Individual rights activists adhere to the ideal of imaginary human beings in a “state of nature.” But this is not how the Constitution sees individuals, especially individuals who are members of a
democratic society. The Framers did not see human beings as soli205
tary creatures, with no relationships or obligations to society.
Indeed, by joining a democratic society, the individual is no longer in a
“state of nature”; thus, laws should not be crafted as if individuals
lived separate from society, disconnected to its democratic process.
However, the current individual rights mentality seems to presume
that individual freedom cannot truly exist within majoritarian rule, as
if majoritarian rule is inherently oppressive. (And indeed, without
structural provisions like federalism and separation of powers, it
would be.)
The Constitution envisions democracy like a family: there must
be processes within the family structure to give each individual some
freedom, and yet also to bind each member to the family as a whole.
An exclusive focus on the individual simply separates that individual
from the larger family, with no concern for what unites the family.
That is why the structural framework is so important: to structure the
larger unit so as to provide both social cohesion and individual freedom in a balanced dynamic. Similarly, the Constitution is primarily
concerned with the workings of the democratic community, not with
trying to return individuals to some imaginary “state of nature.”
201

Id. at x.
Id. at xi.
203
Id. at 5. According to Glendon, the rights revolution has contributed to the
weakening of vital local governments, and to the disdain for politics that is now so
prevalent in America. Id. Consequently, activists now often set their agendas in the
courts rather than in the legislatures.
204
Id.
205
GLENDON, supra note 172, at 67.
202
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Structural provisions not only protect individual liberty, but create a framework in which duties and responsibilities can be developed and fulfilled. Within the constitutional scheme, that framework
is the democratic process, which in turn occurs within the structural
confines of federalism and separation of powers. Because these structures allow individuals to integrate within the larger democratic
process, they facilitate both individual rights and responsibilities.
If individual rights serve to undermine their structural founda206
tions, then they erode their “surest underpinning.” Moreover, the
reliance on judicial enforcement of substantive rights can foster the
illusion that the rights in question are more secure than they in fact
are. Consider, for instance, the history of property rights in constitutional law. To the Framers, one of the primary purposes behind the
new constitution was to develop a governmental structure for the pro207
tection of private property.
This was considered the single right
208
most vulnerable to government infringement. But as it turned out,
property rights were the first casualty of the New Deal transformation
in constitutional law; they went from being a fundamental freedom to
being merely a social interest.
Ironically, the same kind of judicial scrutiny once given to property rights is now being given to certain personal liberties like the
right of privacy. But contrary to the Court’s current approach to this
issue, privacy rights are actually better suited to being protected by
the Constitution’s structural scheme than by judicial dictate. Structural protections allow for a more flexible and dynamic protection,
shaping individual freedoms according to the democratic desires and
interests of the people possessing those freedoms. The existing right
to privacy, however, reflects a judicial mandate on a matter in which
every citizen has an interest and which continually changes as society
and social relationships change.
The development and enforcement of a right to privacy reflects
the New Deal “settlement” that occurred in constitutional law. Under
this settlement, the courts have acquiesced in the shift from a limited
to an activist government, as long as there is judicial scrutiny of individual rights. This was the theory underlying that shift: that the only
way to have an activist central government and individual freedom is
to have the latter imposed by the courts, through the individual rights
provisions of the Constitution.

206
207
208

Id. at 138.
Id. at 24–25.
Id.
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B. A Freedom Better Left to Structural Protections
1.

Judicial Development of Privacy Rights

The Court’s recognition of a constitutional right of privacy be209
gan in Griswold v. Connecticut, where the Court struck down a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives, even by married
210
couples.
The Court ruled that the statute violated “a zone of privacy” created by the “penumbras” that gave “life and substance” to
211
the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights. In outlining this zone
of privacy, the Court stated that even though some rights are not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, they are nonetheless “pe212
ripheral” to various freedoms in the Bill of Rights.
Although Griswold may have initially appeared to link the constitutional protection of sexual activity to married couples, Eisenstadt v.
213
Baird removed any such linkage. In Eisenstadt, the Court extended
Griswold’s holding to include “the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
214
bear or beget a child.” As Justice Brennan declared: “If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be
prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be
215
equally impermissible.”
This decision marked a shift from privacy
as “freedom from surveillance or disclosure of intimate affairs,” to
privacy as “the freedom to engage in certain activities” and “to make
216
certain sorts of choices, free of interference by the state.”
In 2003, the Court noted how its 1977 decision in Carey v. Popu217
lation Services International reiterated that “the reasoning of Griswold
could not be confined to the protection of rights of married
218
adults.”
In overturning a statute that banned the distribution of
209

381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a right of privacy exists).
Id. at 485–86.
211
Id. at 484, 485.
212
Id. at 483.
213
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that a law banning the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons violates the right of privacy, and hence extending the ruling in Griswold to non-married individuals).
214
Id. at 453.
215
Id. (arguing for expanding the right of privacy to the individual from the couple).
216
Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 527–28 (1989); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
217
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
218
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566 (2003) (citing Carey, 431 U.S. 678).
210
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contraceptives to minors as part of a state policy against teen pregnancy, Carey extended the right of privacy to minors engaging in con219
sensual sexual behavior. The Carey Court saw the right of privacy, as
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
to include “‘the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
220
important decisions.’”
221
In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the right of privacy recognized in the previous contraception cases was “broad enough to cover
222
the abortion decision.”
Later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
223
Pennsylvania v. Casey, which reaffirmed Roe, Justice Kennedy elaborated on the right to privacy:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
224
of the mystery of human life.

This “right to define one’s concept of the universe,” linking the right
to an abortion to other kinds of intimate choices, thus became the
latest evolution of the “emanations from penumbras” that first led to
225
a recognized right to privacy.
226
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court applied the right of privacy to
hold that a Texas statute prohibiting people of the same sex from en227
gaging in certain sexual conduct violated the Due Process Clause.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion recognized that the Court’s earlier deci219

Carey, 431 U.S. at 693.
Id. at 684 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977)).
221
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
222
Id. at 155. Thus, a woman’s right to have an abortion was included within the
zone of privacy created in Griswold. Roe was reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1992), which held that a woman’s
right to choose an abortion is grounded in the concept of liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But to create this zone, the
Court had to rule that an unborn fetus was not a “person” under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 873.
223
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
224
Id. at 851.
225
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citing Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497 (1961)). A further development in the expansion of privacy rights to
cover the abortion decision occurred in Stenberg v. Carhart, where the Supreme Court
struck down a Nebraska law prohibiting partial-birth abortion. 530 U.S. 914, 929–30
(2000). In his decision, Justice Breyer found the law burdensome on a woman’s ability to choose. Id. at 930.
226
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
227
Id. at 567.
220
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sion in Eisenstadt had established that the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extended to all adults, regardless of
228
But in Lawrence, the Court gave explicit
gender or marital status.
recognition to a right of sexual intimacy, which it had been unwilling
229
to recognize in previous cases. Seventeen years earlier, the Court in
230
Bowers v. Hardwick had refused to find that the right of homosexuals
to engage in sodomy was a fundamental right, citing to the lack of
231
history or tradition of protecting such a practice. Notwithstanding
this previous reasoning the Court in Lawrence found just the opposite
type of history and tradition, enabling it to rule that sodomy statutes
232
offended an individual’s right to privacy.
Consequently, in the
wake of Lawrence, there is no longer any question as to whether a
right to sexual privacy exists; the only question is what specific aspects
233
of sexual privacy can or cannot be regulated. In his dissent, for instance, Justice Scalia predicted that the next logical step in the rea234
soning of Lawrence would be the legalization of same-sex marriage.
2.

A Liberty That Could Have Been

As the Court has been developing a right to privacy, it has continued to downplay or ignore property rights, which for a century and
a half were an explicit and primary focus of constitutional law. In
fact, only after the Court ceased treating the right to property as a
fundamental right, requiring substantive due process analysis, did it
begin to adopt such an analysis for issues involving non-economic in235
dividual rights.
But the unanswered question resulting from this
228

Id. at 565. Thus, Lawrence held that the Constitution permits homosexuals
complete freedom in the area of sexual intimacy. Id. at 567.
229
Hermann, supra note 161, at 928, 930.
230
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
231
Id. at 192–94.
232
Id. at 190, 192; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575, 584.
233
An emerging issue, for instance, is presented by a case addressing the constitutionality of an Alabama statute regulating the distribution of sexual devices, including the specific issue of whether the right to sexual privacy includes the right to use
sexual devices. See Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005).
234
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235
See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41–42 (1937) (refusing
to scrutinize, using a substantive due process analysis, legislation regulating labor relations, and instead merely deferring to the congressional finding that there was a
rational basis for the regulations and that the regulated activities had a substantial
economic effect).
Prior to 1937, property rights were seen by the Lochner-era Court (Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)) as fundamental to the Constitution’s view of a free
and independent life. But the New Deal constitutional revolution abandoned the
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legacy is whether property rights are more important to individuals
236
This question, however, would be anthan sexual privacy rights.
swered if the Court had pursued a structural path to individual liberty
through the workings of the democratic process. Indeed, privacy is
not the kind of minority-rights issue on which the courts should possess sole authority. Everyone, regardless of their race, religion, or income status, is interested in privacy; it is not a special concern only of
a certain, specified minority. If one is to believe the courts, everyone
sees sexual conduct as being essential to their self-definition; thus,
everyone has an interest in, for example, the issue of contraception
availability. Consequently, privacy can be best protected through the
Constitution’s structural provisions preventing governmental abuse
of the lawmaking process.
Protecting privacy interests through structural provisions would
also allow for more flexibility, instead of locking in a particular judge237
made version of a particular right.
However, because of the way
privacy has evolved as a court-created right, there is an arbitrariness
to the current constitutional doctrine. Why, for instance, did the
Court pick sexual activity as the area covered by privacy rights? And
what if there are many people who define themselves not through
238
their sexual activities but through some other activity?
doctrine of substantive due process that had been applied exclusively to property
rights. Later, with the creation of privacy rights, the doctrine was revived; but this
time the nature of liberty that was found essential under the Constitution for individual freedom, and to which the Court gave heightened protection, was not economic liberty but autonomy in intimate relations.
236
This is particularly evident in the public outrage in response to the public use
takings case of Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), where the Supreme
Court held that a city’s exercise of eminent domain power in furtherance of an economic development plan, even if used to transfer property from one private party to
another, satisfies the constitutional “public use” requirement. Id. at 2665–66.
237
Regarding privacy and abortion rights, the Supreme Court has been accused of
creating new rights. See TOM CAMPBELL, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN PRACTICE 20 (2004).
But to apply the right to privacy to abortion, the Court has had to set in motion a
whole train of consequences, including the ruling that an unborn child was not a
person. Consequently, the right to privacy became a “super-right,” which trumps
even the interest in protecting potential life. Id. at 145, 147. Thus, to arrive at a
right to abortion through a general right to privacy, the Court had to find in the
Constitution a substantive right of privacy beyond anything that had ever existed before.
238
Evidence that the Framers did not recognize or even contemplate any kind of
right to sexual privacy can be seen in the plethora of eighteenth and nineteenth century laws punishing adultery. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Book Note, Sex and Social Order:
The Selective Enforcement of Colonial American Adultery Laws in the English Context, 10 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 191, 208–13 (1998) (reviewing MARY BETH NORTON, FOUNDING
MOTHERS AND FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY
(1996)).
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The irony of the privacy right created by the courts is that it exists in a society where every aspect of personal privacy other than sexual conduct is being eroded. Sexual privacy is constitutionally protected, even though identity and informational privacy is under
239
increasing assault from new technologies.
Professor Fishman has
outlined the host of ways in which technology is invading individual
240
privacy.
He describes the ubiquity of surveillance technology, the
ease with which the internet can disseminate private information, and
the ways in which personal data can be acquired through the use of
241
credit cards, email, and even supermarket discount cards.
And
even more ironic, especially when one considers the constitutional
efforts the judiciary has made to create a right of privacy, the Supreme Court has greatly aided the invasion of privacy by ruling that
the media may publish or broadcast with impunity the contents of intercepted communications known to have been unlawfully intercepted, so long as the media did not participate in the unlawful in242
terception.
VI. CONCLUSION—THE NEXT STEP: A FULL RESTORATION OF
FEDERALISM’S STRUCTURAL PROTECTIONS
Nearly seven decades have elapsed since the Court made its
great constitutional compromise of 1937, abandoning the structural
protections of the Constitution and choosing to protect individual
liberty through the judicial enforcement of substantive individual
239

See generally PATRICK RADDEN KEEFE, CHATTER: DISPATCHES FROM THE SECRET
WORLD OF GLOBAL EAVESDROPPING (2005); ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE
(2005) (outlining all the ways in which personal data can be acquired and how people’s movements and activities can be followed or recorded); see also generally Rebecca
S. Murray, Book Review, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2004) (reviewing CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR
NATION: MEDIA PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN MODERN CULTURE (2000)) (discussing various
types of voyeurism made possible by new technologies, as well as how the media uses
its judicially-granted constitutional rights to invade individual privacy).
240
See Clifford S. Fishman, Technology and the Internet: The Impending Destruction of
Privacy by Betrayers, Grudgers, Snoops, Spammers, Corporations, and the Media, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1503, 1506–15 (2004).
241
Id. at 1505–11.
242
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001) (ruling that the media are immune from civil damages suits brought under the Wiretap Act). Aside from the media, the government also participates in the erosion of personal privacy. For instance, nearly every state employs a data encryption method on their drivers’
licenses. John T. Cross, Comment, Age Verification in the 21st Century: Swiping Away
Your Privacy, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 363, 372 (2005). However, when
the license is swiped through a digital scanner (for age verification purposes for example), the private data stored on the card’s magnetic strip is susceptible to theft.
Currently, more than seven million Americans are victimized by identity theft; and
the driver’s license is a frequent means by which this theft occurs. Id. at 394.
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rights. Given the benefit of hindsight, it can now be seen that much
was sacrificed for the sake of upholding the constitutionality of the
New Deal legislation. Many scholars claim that this compromise has
actually contributed to the erosion of individual liberty in America.
In the view of Randy Barnett, it is the broad use of Commerce Clause
powers “that has most often been used by Congress to restrict the lib243
erties of the people.” For this reason, Barnett suggests returning to
a pre-New Deal understanding, in which the Constitution’s structural
provisions were enforced as strictly as its individual rights protections
244
are enforced now. Indeed, even though it was a calamitous event,
the Great Depression should not continue to haunt constitutional law
more than seven decades later.
Reviving structural provisions like federalism will not only serve
to protect individual liberty, but will also serve to facilitate a more dy245
namic, flexible and representational democracy.
The same jurists
and scholars who advocate judicial deference on structural matters,
combined with judicial scrutiny on individual rights, support the notion of a living constitution. The idea of a living Constitution was articulated by Justice William Brennan: “[T]he genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning . . . but in the adaptability of its
246
great principles to cope with current problems and current needs.”
To advocates of a living Constitution, it is not possible to “lock in” the
Constitution’s enduring principles. However, this is just what the
courts do when protecting individual liberty through “locking in”
their interpretations of substantive individual rights, instead of letting
liberty thrive through the organic workings of the Constitution’s
247
structural provisions.
243

RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 277 (2004).
244
Id. at 278.
245
A criticism often made is that the Constitution does not represent the consent
of the governed; indeed, how can present-day society be governed by provisions
drafted by a small group of delegates more than 200 years ago? As Professor Barnett
asks: “How can a small minority of inhabitants presuming to call themselves ‘We the
People’ consensually bind anyone but themselves?” Id. at 20. The answer lies in the
structural aspect of the Constitution, which sets out the ground rules for a democratic society to continually keep reaching consent on the rules that bind it, not in the
judicial enforcement of selected rights which do not even appear in the Constitution
and which have never been consented to by the people in any constitutional sense.
246
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 23, 27
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
247
It has been suggested that the courts have had to intensify their scrutiny of individual rights precisely because, in the post-New Deal world, we have moved from a
limited federal government with constrained powers to an expansive government
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After Carolene Products, and certainly after Griswold, the Court has
been willing to protect individual rights under a revived substantive
248
due process doctrine.
Perhaps this is because the Court virtually
abandoned, until the 1990s, any enforcement of structural provisions
like federalism that had long been the Constitution’s most effective
way of protecting liberty. Thus, during the second half of the twentieth century, the Court intensified its scrutiny of individual rights because it could no longer rely on the structural provisions to guard
liberty. But given that those structural provisions were at least somewhat revived by the Rehnquist Court’s “New Federalism,” the Roberts
Court should correspondingly lessen its activism in the individual
rights area. This retreat would also relieve the courts of having to decide which rights merit “fundamental” status, as they currently do
under the substantive due process doctrine, such as with privacy.
So far, however, the Court has not adjusted its individual rights
approach to coincide with its federalism approach. As one scholar
has noted, “the Rehnquist Court may well be the most pro-First
249
Amendment Court that has ever sat.” It has protected the right to
250
burn the American flag. It has struck down congressional attempts
251
It has come up with new kinds
to regulate Internet pornography.
of substantive individual rights, such as the Lawrence right to homosexual sex. With respect to commercial speech, it has overturned
252
regulation on tobacco advertising near schools.
It has upheld the

possessing broad powers. See Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil Searches in the Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223, 1240
(2004). For instance, the courts have crafted a detailed and comprehensive Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to respond to an expanded government capable of and
willing to conduct suspicionless searches. But such a jurisprudence was unnecessary
in the Lochner era, when the Court enforced substantive limits on governmental regulatory power, in part because “suspicionless civil search regimes were reduced in absolute terms because of the decreased number of regulatory regimes in existence.”
Id. at 1241. Thus, when the Interstate Commerce Commission was established as an
exercise of expanded federal powers, it was “‘the first federal regulatory agency authorized to police broadly the detailed operations of a significant sector of the U.S.
economy.’” Id. (quoting JERRY L. MASHAW ET. AL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM, CASES AND MATERIALS 4 (5th ed. 2003)). This in turn provided
more opportunities and occasions for an agent of the federal government to conduct
searches of private entities.
248
BARNETT, supra note 243, at 232.
249
Steven G. Calabresi, The Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order and the Rehnquist
Court, 93 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1048 (2005) (reviewing TUSHNET, supra note 81).
250
United States. v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
251
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
252
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
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253

Miranda rule. And it has ruled against the government and in favor
of individual enemy combatants in two of its the most significant
254
cases involving the “War on Terror.” The Court’s ruling in Hamdi
has been called a “strikingly libertarian response for the Court to take
255
during wartime.” And yet, Hamdi was “nothing . . . compared to the
extreme libertarianism the Court displayed, in Rasul v. Bush—the
256
Guantanamo Bay detainees case.”
Contemporary courts, in their focus on individual rights, have
also expanded the types of individual interests that qualify for proce257
dural due process protections. In Hamby v. Neel, the Sixth Circuit
held that an individual held a property interest in coverage under
Tennessee’s Medicaid Demonstration Project, and hence could not
258
be denied coverage without procedural due process. Similarly, the
Second Circuit ruled that individuals had a protected property interest in receiving benefits under New York’s Home Energy Assistance
259
260
Program. And in Greene v. Barrett, the Tenth Circuit found that an
officer with the Laramie County Sheriff’s Department had a protected property interest in his rank, and therefore could not be re261
duced in rank without receiving due process. Thus, in both a procedural and substantive sense, courts have continued their expansive
individual rights jurisprudence—a jurisprudence that might be rendered unnecessary by a revival of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty.

253

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004).
255
Calabresi, supra note 249, at 1055–56.
256
Id. at 1056. Calabresi further posited that the Rehnquist Court has “turned out
to be strikingly libertarian on a whole host of issues.” Id. at 1059.
257
368 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2004).
258
Id. at 562.
259
Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2005).
260
174 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 1999).
261
Id. at 1141. Also, in Youakim v. McDonald, 71 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1995), the
Seventh Circuit held that foster parents had a protected property interest in foster
care benefits. Id. at 1289. In Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1996), the court
held that an illegal stowaway seeking asylum was entitled to the same procedural due
process as other asylum applicants. Id. at 201. That case law derived in large part
from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Plyler v. Doe, holding unconstitutional Texas’s
policy of excluding illegal aliens from its public schools. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982)
(stating that “person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment includes
illegal aliens).
254

